Rambam and the Need for Natural Science

I found a great quote the other day from the Rambam that just fits so well to throw in the face of those anti-science, anti-intellectual dogmaticists who exist in the Orthodox community. It's found in his introduction to the Guide for the Perplexed.

"Do you not see the following fact, that God, may His mention be exalted, wished us to be perfected and the state of our societies to be improved by His laws regarding actions. Now this can come about only after the adoption of intellectual beliefs, the first of which being His apprehension, may He be exalted, according to our capacity. This, in its turn, cannot come about except through metaphysics (his term: maaseh merkavah), and this metaphysics cannot become actual except after a study of natural science (maaseh bereishit)."


[And for those who doubt the correctness of using the terms 'natural science' and 'metaphysics' in place of Rambam's specific terms, I refer you to see just a couple of pages before where the quote above was given. There he says that the terms used that way specifically are correct and he refers the reader to pages in his Mishneh Torah (Mishneh torah, I. ii. 12, and iv. 10) where he explains it.]

It may be ironic that the Rambam, arguably the founder of a series of dogmas (his 13 ikkarim) is apparently the one here stating that scientific knowledge of the world (which's accurate understanding we now understand cannot proceed via dogmatism) is foundational before correct religious beliefs. Naturally, this apparent irony can be made sense of once we understand that the Aristotelian theories on the natural world (on which the Rambam's whole major philosophy depends) were not based on current scientific methodologies, but on simple empiricism and 'proofs' with often unfounded axioms. It was the logical and dialectical method of Aristotle that made the Rambam believe that when Aristotle's logic was sound, it was absolutely true and was the way the world works.

Hence, since Aristotle's theories were based on logic and sound deductive arguments there was no way for it to be overturned. Reason stands eternal and natural science is therefore on as solid a philosophical ground as metaphysics and the Rambam's own understanding of God and Judaism. To the Rambam, it was all logic, and all logic, if sound, is equally correct.


The only problem with Aristotle, as mentioned above, was that his chosen axioms for a given argument were not always based on good empirical facts. For example, in regards to the speeds of falling objects, he said that heavier things fall faster. Clearly, if you drop a brick and a paper in your living room, the brick will fall much faster. But of course we now know that to be a misleading experiment. It's not the weight of the objects that are being well tested, it is the difference in air resistance. Aristotle's method was poor on experimental empiricism - which is why the modern scientific method and its fruits has replaced nearly all of Aristotle's favored reasonings. The experiments don't lie.

Would the logophilic Rambam find favor in the modern scientific method? That is impossible to know. It's problematic because no truth in modern science is conclusive. We have no means to be sure that our scientific reasonings is the way it really is. All we can do is see that no evidence contradicts our theories and ensure parsimony and things of that nature. This is a far cry from the logical, certain world of Maimonides.

Without that sureness, it makes it devilish to try to build a philosophy or theology based on our knowledge of natural science. Nothing is certain and so the ground is always shifting. It makes our constructions far too liable to topple. We live in a transitional age with progress in our understanding coming in spurts and stops. It is paradoxical, but while progress in our knowledge is surely a good thing, the unstable nature of the process through which we get there often leads to depressing existentialism. If we cannot be certain about the nature of our external world, either in terms of physical science or metaphysics, we find that we can only rely on the knowledge of our own existence and how we individually perceive our reality for our philosophical well being. Our expanding knowledge of particulars makes our constructed understanding of the general impossible to maintain.

In the end, we find that we cannot disagree with the basic argument offered by the Rambam. We need to understand natural science before we can rightly begin speculation on metaphysics. Yet we find that life is short and we cannot wait until we get the all clear from those in the science camp. We must resign ourselves to the fact that, in all likelihood, we will not know the secrets of the universe in our lifetimes. So we must proceed even on such shaky terrain!

Although our science is limited, even with all of its limitations, it is far better to engage it than to pretend it does not exist. It is true that it is probably wrong in many places, but it is doubtlessly more correct that it contains more truth than the deep ignorance promoted by those still following wholly irrational ways of thinking. To reiterate: we must proceed!